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THE CONSTITUTION AND SOCIETAL NORMS:
A MODERN CASE FOR FEMALE BREAST EQUALITY
Brenna Helppie-Schmieder
Abstract
“The Constitution and Societal Norms: A Modern Case for Female Breast Equality”
argues that laws prohibiting the public display of the female breast, but not the male breast, are
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. That these laws
discriminate against women is obvious, yet courts have historically refused to recognize an
Equal Protection Clause violation. However, the primary reasons courts rely upon are ripe for
review. Most significantly, courts typically justify female breast censorship laws based on the
government interest in protecting public sensibilities, without recognizing that public
sensibilities change. Indeed, perceptions of the public female breast have changed. Taking
these modern-day perceptions into account reveals that the protection of public sensibilities is, in
fact, an inadequate governmental interest. Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause principles, as
articulated in US v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, provide further support for finding
female breast censorship laws unconstitutional. This Article also explains why female breast
censorship laws are normatively harmful to both women and society. Ultimately, “The
Constitution and Societal Norms: A Modern Case for Female Breast Equality” argues that laws
prohibiting the public display of the female breast, but not the male breast, are harmful,
outdated, and unconstitutional.

INTRODUCTION
Laws prohibiting public displays of the female breast, but not the male breast, should be
deemed unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.1 Several
states and municipalities have laws prohibiting obscenity and public nudity. But many such
laws, in addition to outlawing the public display of genitals, outlaw the public display of the
female breast. Although the normativity of obscenity and public nudity laws are an issue in their
own right, this Article focuses specifically on the censorship of female breasts.2
For example, Louisiana’s obscenity statute carries a punishment of up to three years
imprisonment or a $2,500 fine for a first time conviction.3 Under this statute, obscenity is
defined as the “[e]xposure of the genitals, pubic hair, anus, vulva, or female breast nipples in any
public place . . . with the intent of arousing sexual desire or which appeals to prurient interest or
is patently offensive.”4 In Delaware, “[a] male is guilty of indecent exposure in the second
degree if he exposes his genitals or buttocks under circumstances in which he knows his conduct
is likely to cause affront or alarm to another person.”5 A female is guilty of the same if “she
exposes her genitals, breast or buttocks under circumstances in which she knows her conduct is
likely to cause affront or alarm to another person.”6 In Chicago, one can be fined between $100

1

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
2
In this Article, I use “censorship” as an umbrella term that encompasses the many ways the female breast is legally
regulated separate and unique from the male breast. I use the word “female” to refer to people born biologically
female, as that is how courts understand classifications based on sex. See generally, Luke Boso, A (Trans)genderInclusive Equal Protection Analysis of Public Female Toplessness, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY 143, 13–20 (2009)
(arguing that courts’ rigid understanding of sex undermines commonly-made arguments upholding female breast
censorship laws). I use the word “women” to refer to individuals who identify as women.
3
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (G)(1)(2014).
4
Id. § 14:106 (A)(1) (emphasis added). Were a constitutional challenge like the one discussed in Part III to fail, one
could use the same evidence of society’s current norms to defend against prosecutions under statutes like
Louisiana’s on the ground that the exposed female nipple on its own does not appeal to the prurient interest and is
not patently offensive. Thus, unless the defendant intends to arouse sexual desire, the prosecution cannot prove the
necessary elements of the statute.
5
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 764(a) (1995).
6
Id. § 764(b) (emphasis added).
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and $500 for indecent exposure, which includes exposing to public view: “the genitals, vulva,
pubis, pubic hair, buttocks, perineum, anus, anal region, or pubic hair region of any person, or
any portion of the breast at or below the upper edge of the areola thereof of any female person.”7
In the United States, female breast censorship is far-reaching. State laws and municipal
ordinances that censor the female breast include “zoning ordinances, public exposure or
lewdness ordinances and statutes, ordinances regulating sexually-oriented businesses, laws aimed
at nude sunbathing, regulations of business and liquor licenses, and obscenity statutes.”8 Given
the ad hoc tangle of laws and ordinances that censor, regulate, and criminalize the female breast,
this Article focuses on the higher level constitutional issues bound up in any regulation of the
female breast. The censorship of the public female breast, but not the public male breast, should
be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Such censorship violates the Equal Protection
Clause because one’s breast is regulated under a different set of laws if one is female rather than
male. Surprisingly, however, many courts that have confronted Equal Protection Clause
arguments regarding this issue have upheld these facially discriminatory laws.9 This Article
offers a modern challenge.10

7

Chicago, Code of Ordinances § 8-8-080 (emphasis added).
Virginia F. Milstead, Forbidding Female Toplessness: Why "Real Difference" Jurisprudence Lacks "Support" and
What Can Be Done About It, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 276–77 (2005).
9
See infra Part III.
10
A significant scholarship exists which analyzes breast censorship laws under the Equal Protection Clause from a
variety of angles. See, e.g., Carmen M. Cusack, Boob Laws: An Analysis of Social Deviance Within Gender,
Families, or the Home (Etudes 2), 33 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 197, 197–98 (2012) (advancing “three different
constitutional arguments to prove that municipalities that prohibit some females from exposing their nipples should
be challenged on constitutional grounds.”); see also Milstead, supra note 8, at 278–79 (“seek[ing] to dismantle the
doctrine of real difference as the standard of review for Fourteenth Amendment gender cases . . . seek[ing] to reveal
that these differences do not provide the best threshold determination for equal protection.” (citations omitted)); see
also Christina DeJong & Christopher E. Smith, Equal Protection, Gender, and Justice at the Dawn of A New
Century, 14 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 125 (1999) (“explor[ing] the applicability of equal protection principles to the
field of criminal justice,” including breast exposure laws); see generally Alyssa Silver, Breasts on the Beach: Legal
in New York?, 9 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 217 (1994) (focusing on New York’s legal history and treatment of the public
female breast). This Article adds to the argument by: presenting modern evidence of changing public norms to
specifically challenge the oft-proffered “public sensibilities” governmental interest, see e.g., People v. David, 152
Misc. 2d 66, 67 (Munroe Cnty. Ct. 1991), discussing new decisions at the intersection of First Amendment and
8
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys the history of female breast
censorship, including highlighting the shifting societal opinion of the public female breast over
time. This history lays the groundwork to show that the sexualization of the female breast has
allowed for its continued censorship.
Part I also includes a primer of First Amendment doctrine as it relates to obscenity law
and expressive speech. Although the First Amendment has a role to play in combating
discriminatory obscenity laws, it is ancillary in this Article. This is because the First Amendment
protects only some instances of the public female breast. The Equal Protection Clause goes much
further.
Next, in order to frame the argument in Part III, Part I reviews the Equal Protection
Clause doctrine as it relates to sex. The doctrine has produced the following intermediate
scrutiny test for judging the constitutionality of laws that classify on the basis of sex: the sexbased classification must have an important—or exceedingly persuasive—governmental
objective, and the means must be substantially related to that objective.11
Finally, Part I explores some of the few cases in which courts have struck down female
breast censorship laws. The argument in Part III builds on, and augments, the reasoning in these
decisions.
Part II makes three normative arguments as to why female breast censorship is harmful.
First, such censorship perpetuates heterosexual male definitions of eroticism, contributing to the
sexual and political subjugation of women. Second, female breast censorship laws enforce
dangerous body image issues. Lastly, and most simply, these laws deprive women of the choice
to be comfortable. Part II, then, elucidates the real-world implications of female breast
Equal Protection Clause challenges, and suggesting that recent Supreme Court precedent further supports finding
female breast censorship laws unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
11
See infra Part I.D; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).
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censorship in an effort to show that arguing for, or against, female breast equality is much more
than a theoretical exercise.
Finally, using the two-pronged intermediate scrutiny test as an anchor, Part III
demonstrates that female breast censorship laws violate the Equal Protection Clause. Courts that
uphold female breast censorship laws commonly cite the protection of public sensibilities as the
important governmental objective that satisfies the first prong. The changing understanding of
the public female breast, however, severely undermines this justification. Indeed, public norms
now include a growing acceptance of the public female breast. Moreover, recent Supreme Court
dicta about Equal Protection Clause principles lend additional support to the conclusion that
female breast censorship laws violate the Equal Protection Clause. Ultimately, this Article aims
to persuade that laws prohibiting public displays of the female breast, but not the male breast, are
outdated, harmful, and unconstitutional.
I.

BREAST CENSORSHIP AND FRAMING THE LAW

A. History of Society’s Perception of the Female Breast
The history of society’s perception of the female breast sheds some light on why its legal
censorship is a modern-day reality.12 Important to keep in mind, however, is that “much of the
documented epic of the [female] breast is a voyeuristic one, told from the perspective of those
who lack the organs yet still claim ultimate authority on the subject.”13 That men have been the
primary authors of history is not a radical notion; but, when analyzing how the female breast

12

See Danielle Moriber, Note, A Right to Bare All? Female Public Toplessness and Dealing with the Laws That
Prohibit, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 453, 454 (2010) (“The wide variety of laws regulating women more
stringently than men demonstrates a societal gender differentiation in conceptualizing chests.” (citations omitted)).
13
Natalie Angier, Goddesses, Harlots and Other Male Fantasies,
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/02/23/reviews/970223.23angiert.html (reviewing MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY
OF THE BREAST (1997)) (“Ms. Yalom . . . found very little in the record to indicate how women have felt about their
breasts: whether they took pleasure in them, the extent to which they chose to display their breasts or if they had any
say in the debate over wet-nursing.”)
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came to be censored and regulated in the United States, it is a notable factor. The historicizing of
the female breast by men, after all, can be understood as a type of censorship itself.14
The following is an abbreviated, primarily Western, history of the female breast.15 From
the ancient civilizations to modern day United States, society’s understanding of the female
breast has fluctuated. Throughout history, however, two dominant understandings of the female
breast emerge: its biological function and its erotic nature.16 As will be seen, the eroticization of
the female breast is what allows for its continued censorship.
In pre-Greek ancient civilizations, female breasts were emphasized and idolized, as
evidenced by artwork and statues depicting gods with full, uncovered breasts.17 Much of the
idolizing revolved around women’s lactation abilities.18 However, the public veneration of the
female breast faded with the rise of ancient Greece, during which time the breast was slowly
“supplanted by . . . the ‘reign of the phallus.’”19
Between 6th century BC and 1st century AD, the general time period of the events in the
Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) and Christian New Testament, society’s understanding of the
female breast returned to a place of honor.20 Society valued the breast for its capacity to feed
infants, highlighting a cultural focus on women as mothers.21

14

See ADELINE MASQUELIER, DIRT, UNDRESS, AND DIFFERENCE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE BODY'S
SURFACE 4 (2005) (“[W]omen’s bodies have historically provided a fertile terrain for imagining, reasserting, or
contesting the porous boundaries of moral worlds. The sexualization of power relations and the erotics of
conquest—often represented as the male penetration of a veiled female interior—have proven remarkably
resilient.”).
15
Much of this history is informed by scholar Marilyn Yalom’s work: MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY OF THE
BREAST (1997).
16
See generally MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY OF THE BREAST (1997).
17
See id. at 10–12.
18
See id. at 9–10.
19
Id. at 16 (quoting classics scholar, Eva Keuls).
20
Id. at 5. (“[W]e find women validated primarily as mothers. . . [i]n both the Jewish and Christian
traditions, breasts were honored as milk-producing vessels necessary for the survival of the Hebrew people
and, later, the followers of Jesus.”).
21
See id.
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This view faded with the Renaissance, during which the female breast took on a sexual
connotation.22 By the fifteenth century, art and literature began depicting women’s breasts as
erotic.23 Paintings showed women holding out their breasts, “served up like a piece of fruit for
the delectation of an observer,” or a man’s hand cupped around a woman’s breast which “spoke
for the sense of possession that men believed was their due.”24
In the seventeenth century the pendulum began to swing back toward an understanding of
the female breast as mainly biological—that is, existing to provide for children.25 Around this
time, mothers began to nurse their own infants, turning away from wet nurses.26 Some artwork
depicting women with exposed breasts, which represented democratic government, exemplified
the public belief in mothers as contributing to the community through child-rearing.27 Then
again, other artwork seemed to continue the emphasis on the erotic breast.28
Eighteenth-century England marked a cultural high point for the obsession with women
as mothers.29 Motherhood was revered and becoming less associated with sexuality.30

22

See generally, YALOM, supra note 16, Chapter Two: The Erotic Breast: “Orbs of Heavenly Frame.”
YALOM, supra note 16, at 5.
24
Angier, supra note 13 (quoting YALOM).
25
YALOM, supra note 16, at 5 (this understanding was in the context of mothers being “seen as making a
major contribution to the overall well-being of her household and community”).
26
See id.; see also Emily E. Stevens, et al., A History of Infant Feeding, 18(2) J PERINATAL EDUC. 32
(Spring 2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2684040/ (reviewing the
“widespread disapproval of wet nursing” during the Renaissance, the changes in the profession of wet
nursing, and the different practices among social classes).
27
See YALOM, supra note 16, at 5–6; see generally id. Chapter 4: The Political Breast: Bosoms for the
Nation.
28
See Anne Hollander, Fashion in Nudity, 30 Ga. Rev. 642, 661 (1976) (discussing the eroticism of the bodice in
fashion at the time, and noting “[t]he late seventeenth century abounds, for example, in paintings of ladies with very
emphatic breasts escaping from their necklines- breasts which seem larger, rounder, and shinier than similarly
unveiled ones in earlier centuries . . . Even the most consciously erotic mammary displays in the Renaissance were
modest in size and sometimes vague in shape compared with those in certain Dutch or Italian versions painted after
1670.”).
29
See generally Ruth Perry, Colonizing the Breast: Sexuality and Maternity in Eighteenth-Century
England, 2 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, 204, 214 (1991).
30
See id. at 215.
23

7

Unsurprisingly, along with this shift came a renewed cultural focus on the biological, rather than
the sexual, purposes of women’s breasts.31
The understanding of women as homemakers and mothers continued into the nineteenthcentury Victorian Era.32 During this time, women wore constricting clothing.33 Restrictive
garments, also popular in the United States, “called for almost complete covering of the upper
body.”34 Thus, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century fashion can be viewed as a type of societal
female breast censorship, which emphasized women’s relegation to the domestic sphere.35
The nineteenth century also gave rise to the new fields of psychology and psychoanalysis,
which merged the breast’s biological purpose of feeding infants with a sexual significance.36
The founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, was attempting to prove that “sucking at the
breast was not only the child’s first activity, but also the starting point of one’s entire sexual
life.”37 The western history of the female breast is much a story about society’s emphasis of the
breast as primarily biological or primarily sexual. In both cases, historical indicators suggest that
society played a significant role in how women should understand their own breasts.
B. The Modern Female Breast and Its Censorship
In the twentieth century, women in the United States began publically demanding a voice
in how to define their breasts, although such definitions still revolved largely around sexuality

31

See id. at 215–16.
See Moriber, supra note 12, at 456 (in the Victorian era, there were “no meaningful job opportunities
available for women, and, because they were dependent on men, their role in society centered around
entertaining and keeping house.” (citation omitted)).
33
See id. at 456 (e.g., girdles and petticoats).
34
Id. (citation omitted).
35
Jill Fields, 'Fighting the Corsetless Evil': Shaping Corsets and Culture, 1900-1930, 33 J. SOC. HIST. 355, 355–56
(1999) (noting that “[s]cholarship on nineteenth-century women's history and dress explores the power of corsets to
regulate women's behavior as well as to signify women's subordinate status,” but acknowledging scholarly
disagreement about the meaning of the corset).
36
See YALOM, supra note 16, at 6.
37
Id. In this same time period, with the rise of mass-production capabilities, the female breast also became
ripe for commercialization and profit. Factory-made corsets, and eventually bras, worked their way into
the national stream of commerce. Id.
32
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and biology. These two understandings not only fit into a historical framework but also a
scientific one.
People have long debated why female breasts evolutionarily exist. Some argue that
female breasts are a naturally selected organ, existing for the purpose of feeding infants.38
Others argue that female breasts are sexually selected organs, existing due to male sexual
preference.39 On one hand, female breasts help create and store fat that allows for easier
lactation, which is used to feed infants.40 On the other hand, “a woman’s attractiveness to [men]
seems to have been enhanced by breast development.”41 Although it is true that the size and
shape of the female breast can play a role in sexual attractiveness,42 there is no consensus as to
whether males’ sexual attraction to female breasts was secondary to breasts’ biological function,
or vice versa.43
In the 1960s and 70s, two breast-related social phenomena took hold: bra-burning and
breast implants.44 Some women refused to wear bras as a cultural statement of women’s
empowerment.45 Other women sought to surgically enlarge their breast size to enhance their

38

See Tracy Clark-Flory, On the rack: A cultural history of breasts, SALON (May 9, 2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/05/10/on_the_rack_a_cultural_history_of_breasts/ (interviewing author Florence
Williams).
39
See id.
40
Id.
41
Peter Anderson, Rose E. Frisch, et al., The Reproductive Role of the Human Breast [and Comments and Reply],
24 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, 25, 26 (1983).
42
Id.
43
See Clark-Flory, supra note 38.
44
See YALOM, supra note 16, at 7; Clark-Flory, supra note 38 (“The first silicon breast implant was performed in
1962. . . It was particularly popular among women who made their living onstage . . . Eventually it leaked into the
broader culture, and certainly by the ’70s and ’80s women were going for this. Then there was the implant scare of
the ’90s, in which a lot of women had problems with their implants, and the FDA actually banned them for 14 years.
But now they’re back . . . In fact, more women are getting implants now than ever before — over 300,000 a year.”).
45
See YALOM, supra note 16, at 7 (“By burning bras, more figuratively than literally, women undermined the basic
idea of control coming from outside oneself. Henceforth women could question the authority of such previously
sacrosanct agencies as medicine and fashion.”); Alix Kates Shulman, Sex and Power: Sexual Bases of Radical
Feminism, 5 Signs: Jour. of Women in Culture and Society, 590, 594–95 (recounting the early demonstration that
led to the myth of literal bra-burning, in which sixty feminists picketed the Miss American Pageant, including by
filling a trash can with “items of female ‘torture’ like curlers, bras, girdles, and high-heeled shoes.”)
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attractiveness.46 Both actions revolved around a woman’s choice of how her breasts would be
displayed, which marked an important moment in the history of the female breast.47
At the same time, however, states began enacting public nudity and indecency laws48 that
explicitly prohibited public displays of the female breast, but not the male breast.49
Municipalities also enacted such ordinances. In 1967, for example, New York revised its
previously gender-neutral public anti-exposure statute to specifically restrict the female breast.50
The very categories of these laws—obscenity, lewdness, public nudity—reveal that the
sexualization of the female breast is what leads to its censorship.51 Indeed, most states have

46

See M. Grigg, et al. Information for Women About the Safety of Silicone Breast Implants (2000), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44775/.
47
See YALOM, supra note 16, at 7–8.
48
The common law, too, imposed limits on public nudity. See Duvallon v. State, 404 So. 2d 196, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (“At common law, indecent exposure was a public nuisance and punishable as a misdemeanor. It was
viewed as an offense against religion and morality, involving ‘open and grossly scandalous lewdness.’ Rex v.
Sedley, (1963) 1 Sid. 168, is often cited by commentators as support for this view. Today, the common law crime
has been supplanted by statutory offenses in almost every jurisdiction in this country. These statutes vary somewhat
as to wording, but a survey of the case law indicates that many of the same elements of the common law crime have
been retained.” (citations omitted)).
49
See, e.g., Indiana’s Indecent Exposure statute, effective in 1977, defines nudity as “the showing of the human
male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female
breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a
discernibly turgid state.” IND. CODE ANN § 35-45-4-1 (West 2015). Delaware’s indecent exposure statute, passed in
1982, finds a female guilty of second degree indecent exposure “if she exposes her genitals, breast or buttocks under
circumstances in which she knows her conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm to another person.” DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 764(b) (West)(2015). See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-301 (West 2015) (defining “intimate parts” as
“external genitalia, perineum, anus or pubes of any person or the breast of a female person.”). Though not
comprehensive, the sample of statutes at least hints at the possible correlation between women taking breast
definition into their own hands with states specifically taking aim to limit the public female breast. Later, states and
cities turned to zoning laws to regulate nudity and sex-based businesses, giving special attention to the female
breast. See, e.g., Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing 1995 New York City
Council regulation restricting sexually-oriented businesses).
50
New York’s anti-exposure law, first adopted in 1881, was revised in 1935 to prohibit nudity and nudist colonies,
was recodified in 1964 under “public lewdness,” and was amended in 1967 “specifically to cover ‘exposure of a
female,’” which included not covering “her breast below the top of the aureola” [sic]. Reena N. Glazer, Women's
Body Image and the Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 113, 119, n. 42 (1993) (citing 1967 N.Y. Laws 1074, amended by 1970
N.Y. Laws 100, repealed by 1983 N.Y. Laws 1574). The statute also included an exception for women “entertaining
or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.” Id. at 120.
51
See Moriber, supra note 12 (“In the United States . . . women have traditionally been made to cover their breasts
because of a socially ascribed sexual meaning.”); and Glazer, supra note 50, at 135; and Clark-Flory, supra note 38
(“the sexualization of breasts is a reality and we’re not going to change that any time soon”).
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passed laws to allow the public female breast during breastfeeding,52 demonstrating that female
breast censorship has little, if anything, to do with its biological function.
The modern legal censorship of the public female breast, however, is inconsistent with
the growing societal acceptance of the public female breast—an acceptance accelerated by social
media. For example, in 2014, Scout Willis, the daughter of actors Demi Moore and Bruce
Willis, walked around New York City with her breasts exposed as a form of protest.53 Willis
was protesting Instagram, the social media picture-sharing website, because of its policy
categorizing displays of the female areola as “instances of abuse.”54 Willis explained:
Women are regularly kicked off Instagram for posting photos with any portion of
the areola exposed, while photos sans nipple -- degrading as they might be -remain unchallenged. So I walked around New York topless and documented it
on Twitter, pointing out that what is legal by New York state law is not allowed
on Instagram.55
Willis’s action added fuel to Free the Nipple, a campaign for equal topless56 rights for
women, when she used the #FreetheNipple hashtag during her protest.57 Lina Esco, creator of
the campaign as well as a film of the same name, has argued, “[t]he boob or the nipple is the first

52

See National Conference of State Legislatures, Breastfeeding State Laws, September 2, 2015, available
at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx (noting that “[f]orty-nine states, the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have laws that specifically allow women to breastfeed in any
public or private location,” and “[t]wenty-nine states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands
exempt breastfeeding from public indecency laws.”).
53
See Stephanie Marcus, Scout Willis Posts Topless Photos On Twitter To Protest Instagram's Anti-Nudity
Policy, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (May 28, 2014, 4:16pm), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/28/scoutwillis-topless_n_5405769.html/.
54
Scout Willis, Scout Willis Topless Instagram Protest, XOJANE.COM, (June 2, 2014),
http://www.xojane.com/issues/scout-willis-topless-instagram-protest.
55
Id.
56
Sometimes referred to as “topfree.” See, e.g., Topfree Equal Rights Association (TERA), http://www.tera.ca/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2015).
57
See #FreeTheNipple: Topless Protest Against Internet Censorship Follows Scout Willis Instagram
Challenge, HUFFINGTONPOST.CO.UK (Apr. 6, 2014, 12:37BST),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/04/freethenipple-topless-protest-internet-censorship-scout-willisinstagram-challenge-pictures_n_5443907.html; see also What is Free the Nipple, FREE THE NIPPLE (2014),
http://www.freethenipple.com/.
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thing you see when you’re born, it’s the thing you depend on, it’s the first thing that nourishes
us, at what point did it become an obscene thing?”58
The Topfree Rights Association (TERA) is another example of the modern movement for
female breast equality.59 This organization was formed in Canada in 1997,60 and provides legal
aid for female topless issues, mostly in Canada and the United States. TERA’s statement of
purpose describes being motivated by simple equality, individual choice, and female comfort.61
GoTopless, yet another example of the modern era of female breast definition and
equality, focuses on a growing willingness of women to bare their nude breasts in public.
GoTopless was founded in 2007, and promotes Go Topless Day, in which women are
encouraged to bare their breasts, and males are encouraged to wear bikinis or bras.62
Willis’s demonstration, Free the Nipple, TERA, and GoTopless might be characterized as
political protests, and, therefore, fairly questioned in terms of how representative they are of
societal norms of the female breast. After all, political protests typically emerge to change
societal norms. Still, that these protests have cropped up in the last twenty years, and three in the
last eight years, is evidence that substantial segments of society find female breast censorship
laws repugnant enough to take action against them.

58

#FreeTheNipple: Topless Protest Against Internet Censorship Follows Scout Willis Instagram
Challenge, HUFFINGTONPOST.CO.UK (Apr. 6, 2014, 12:37BST),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/04/freethenipple-topless-protest-internet-censorship-scout-willisinstagram-challenge-pictures_n_5443907.html
59
See Statement of Purpose and Principles, TOPFREE EQUAL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.tera.ca/index.html#Purpose (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
60
News Releases, TOPFREE EQUAL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION (Jun. 14, 1997),
http://www.tera.ca/news.html#97-06-14.
61
Id. at http://www.tera.ca/index.html#Purpose.
62
GOTOPLESS.ORG, http://gotopless.org/index.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). Although GoTopless claims
to be motivated by notions of liberal equality—even invoking the Constitution on the front page of its
website—at least one journalist has pointed out that the founder of GoTopless is also the spiritual leader of
the Raelian Movement, which has been accused of cult-like activities. See Katy Kelleher, Go Topless
Equality Movement Founded By Sketchy Cult Leader, JEZEBEL.COM (August 23, 2010),
http://jezebel.com/5619500/go-topless-equality-movement-founded-by-sketchy-cult-leader.
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The Outdoor Co-Ed Topless Pulp Fiction Appreciation Society, on the other hand, is not
overtly political. Instead, members of the group are simply trying to take advantage of New
York’s topless equality.63 The organization is made up of mostly women, who read in public
places around New York City while wearing no tops.64 By taking advantage of the law in a
public way—they often document their meet-ups on a blog—they demonstrate that female breast
equality is about more than theoretical debate; it implicates actual behavior.
The fashion industry, too, has signaled a shift toward public female breast acceptance.
For example, at the 2014 London Fashion Week, several designers showcased female garments
that revealed the nipple.65 Sheer garments were the “leftfield trend,” with several collections
“suggest[ing] that day-to-day nipple freedom might just be a hair’s breadth away.”66
Protest actions, social organizations and even fashion trends are all indicators of shifts in
society’s understanding of the public female breast.67 The recent wave of actions challenging
female breast censorship suggests that public norms are expanding to make room for the public
female breast. The ubiquity of public and workplace breastfeeding,68 too, supports this
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See infra Part I.E.1; I.E.3.
The Outdoor Co-ed Topless Pulp Fiction Appreciation Society,
http://coedtoplesspulpfiction.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
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See Nathalie Olah, Why nipples were much more than just a trend at London Fashion Week, THEGUARDIAN.COM
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2014/sep/19/why-nipples-were-much-more-than-just-a-trendat-london-fashion-week.
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female breast. See DeJong & Smith, supra note 10, at 142 (“women often wear tops of thin or tight-fitting materials
that reveal their nipples, albeit thinly covered by fabric, to the eyes of the public . . . [F]emale breasts that are
uncovered or nearly uncovered are pervasive in advertising and entertainment media.”). See also 108 Ridiculously
Naked Fall/Winter Outfits, COSMOPOLITAN.COM, http://www.cosmopolitan.com/stylebeauty/fashion/news/g4620/nakedest-runway-looks-nyfw-fall-2015/? (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (“The biggest
runway trend of fall 2015 is definitely nipples.”).
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Even some municipalities seem to be accepting the public female breast. In 2012, San Francisco passed a public
nudity ordinance, which only prohibited exposure of a person’s “genitals, perineum, or anal region,” but not breasts.
S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE ORDINANCE § 154(b) (2012), available at
http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/ordinances12/o0234-12.pdf.
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See supra note 52, and accompanying text; see generally Alexis Grant, What Women Should Know about
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understanding. These evolving societal standards play a central role in the constitutionality of
female breast censorship, ultimately strengthening the argument to find such censorship laws
unconstitutional.
C. First Amendment Issues
The First Amendment69 protects some instances of the public female breast, but is an
insufficient shield for total female breast equality. It is therefore important to understand the
First Amendment’s role in female breast censorship cases to understand its limits.
Governmental laws regulating the content of any speech—which includes actions that
contain communicative messages70—are habitually challenged for infringing on the First
Amendment. For example, in United States v. O'Brien, a defendant argued that burning a draft
card was “symbolic speech” protected by the First Amendment.71 As another example,
defendants who have been charged with an obscenity violation may base their defense on a
constitutional argument alleging that the law in question violates the First Amendment.72
Additionally, owners of sex-related businesses, like strip clubs and adult-themed stores, often use
the First Amendment to challenge zoning laws that restrict their businesses to undesirable
locations.73 Protesting a female breast censorship law by demonstrating topless in public is
arguably speech and invokes the First Amendment. In such instances, two First Amendment
doctrines come into play: (1) the regulation of obscene speech, and (2) the regulation of
expressive conduct.
69

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).
70
See Brown v. State, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966); see also Hightower v. City of San Francisco, 77 F. Supp. 3d
867, 875 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The First Amendment protects not only the expression of ideas through printed or
spoken words, but also symbolic speech—nonverbal activity ... sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
71
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
72
See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
73
See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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“[A]s a general matter, ... government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”74 But there are limited exceptions,
including obscenity.75 Obscene speech is a category of unprotected speech that can be prevented
and regulated.76 The modern test for whether material is obscene comes from Miller v.
California.77 Generally, if the speech meets the three prongs of the Miller test, it is obscene and
may be freely regulated.78 The test is:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.79
Because of the last element, obscene speech with political value escapes the obscenity
label.80 Not only that, but political speech occupies a special status in First Amendment
jurisprudence, and is strongly protected against governmental regulation.81 Therefore, if public
nudity is speech, it can likely avoid being categorized as obscene so long as it has political value.
But is public nudity speech? The Supreme Court has noted, “Being ‘in a state of nudity’
is not an inherently expressive condition.”82 Lower courts have agreed.83 Accordingly, “[i]n

74

Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)).
76
See id. at 2733–34; Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379, 1380 (2008)
(“If expression or conduct qualifies as obscenity, it is excluded from the First Amendment's protective reach.”
(citations omitted)).
77
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
78
See id. at 23–25.
79
Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted). Ordinances or statutes concerning zoning of obscene material are also
governed by Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
80
See, e.g., United States v. Various Articles of Merch., 230 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 15,
2000) (finding nudist lifestyle “magazines qualify for First Amendment protection because of their political value.”).
81
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our First
Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political
speech occupies the highest, most protected position.”).
82
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion).
83
See e.g., Hightower v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C-12-5841 EMC, 2013 WL 361115, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 2013) (citing South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 610 (11th Cir.1984) (“nudity is
protected as speech only when combined with some mode of expression which itself is entitled to first amendment
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deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the
First Amendment into play, [the Court has] asked whether [a]n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”84
Ongoing litigation in San Francisco is illustrative. In Hightower v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, two plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit “alleging that the enforcement of a San
Francisco ordinance that bars nudity on, e.g., public streets and sidewalks violates their First
Amendment rights.”85 The plaintiffs had protested the ordinance by appearing nude in public.86
At least twice, they were issued citations and taken into custody.87
The first question the court addressed was whether the plaintiffs’ nudity was speech such
that it received First Amendment protection. The court identified the two-part test (intent to
convey a message, and likelihood it would be understood), and applied it to multiple instances of
the plaintiffs protesting in the nude.88 In a fact-intensive decision, the court found that in some
instances, the nudity constituted expressive speech, and in others it did not.89 If nudity is
expressive speech, it is more difficult for the government to regulate.90
As can be seen, the First Amendment is not a complete shield against all female breast
censorship laws. For instance, topless sunbathing would be unlikely to receive First Amendment
protection, either due to such conduct being labeled obscene, or due to a finding that it is not
expressive conduct. Protesting a public nudity law by exposing one’s breasts, however, is
protection.”)); see also State v. Turner, 382 N.W.2d 252, 253 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (“The Minnesota Supreme
Court has held that ‘nudity is not protected expression, but conduct, which the city has a substantial interest in
regulating via its police power.’” (citation omitted)).
84
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quotation omitted).
85
Hightower v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 77 F. Supp. 3d 867, 872 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
86
See id. at 873.
87
See id.
88
See id. at 876.
89
See generally id. at 877–87.
90
See id. at 880–81 (discussing and applying the O’Brien test for government regulation of expressive conduct).
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conceivably protected, because the conduct—nudity—conveys a political message.91 This likely
protection provides support for the argument that breast censorship laws fail the intermediate
scrutiny test, as will be further described in Part III.
D. Equal Protection Clause Doctrine for Classifications Based on Sex
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that, “No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”92
The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to require that laws that classify on the basis of
sex satisfy intermediate scrutiny. For the law to be deemed valid under this standard, the
classification must serve an “important governmental objective[] and . . . the discriminatory
means employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of [that] objective[].”93
The Court’s jurisprudence on the Equal Protection Clause as it relates to sex has evolved
greatly, albeit clumsily, since its origins in Reed v. Reed.94 In Reed, the mother and father of a
decedent both sought to control administration of his estate.95 The father was chosen based on
an Idaho statute that required the male to be chosen over the female if both parents were equally
qualified.96 Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous
Court, declared the statute’s preference for males to be “arbitrary” and one that could not “stand
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See Tagami v. City of Chicago, No. 14 CV 9074, 2015 WL 4187209, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2015) (holding
that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a First Amendment claim against an indecency ordinance “when she appeared
in public wearing opaque body paint covering her otherwise bare chest during a GoTopless Day [female topless
protest] event.”); see also Moriber, supra note 12, at 455 (“If a woman is engaged in unassociated nudity, or nudity
that is not intertwined with ‘speech’ or a ‘message’ separate from the nudity, the nudity is mere conduct and is not
entitled to First Amendment Protection. If, however, the nudity is not ‘nudity for nudity's sake’ and is associated
with speech as part of a specific message, it will likely fall under the protections of the First Amendment . . .
Ironically, because protesting is highly valued and generally protected as political speech, when women are
protesting topless bans, their specific expression will likely be permissible.”).
92
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The Equal Protection Clause has also been reverse incorporated into the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, so as to apply to federal government action in addition to state government
action. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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See id. at 71–72.
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See id. at 71–73.
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in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment's command that no State deny the equal protection of
the laws to any person within its jurisdiction.”97 The Court thus struck down a sex-based
distinction under a standard that resembled rational basis review.
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court went much further and declared
that classifications on the basis of sex were “inherently suspect” and subject to strict scrutiny
judicial review.98 In Frontiero, a female Air Force member challenged a federal law that
required her to prove her husband was in fact dependent on her in order to receive certain
benefits, although a man could claim his wife as a dependent without any such proof.99 The
Court held that a law that accorded “differential treatment to male and female members of the
uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience . . . violate[d]
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”100 Importantly, the Court recognized the
nation’s “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,” based on ideas of romantic
paternalism, that “in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”101
Yet, strict scrutiny review for sex-based classifications did not last. In Craig v. Boren,
the Court held that laws with classifications based on sex would be subject to “elevated or
‘intermediate’ level scrutiny.”102 In Boren, an Oklahoma statute prohibited a certain type of beer
to be sold to males under the age of 21, but to females only under the age of 18.103 Despite an
argument that the law was tailored to address traffic safety issues, the Court held that it
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“invidiously discriminate[d] against males 18-20 years of age.”104 Thus, in the same case that
the Court introduced the intermediate scrutiny test, it used it to strike down a law.
In later cases, like Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,105 and United States v.
Virginia,106 the Court clarified its intermediate scrutiny standard. Now, “[t]he party seeking to
uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of
showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.”107 That is, the sexbased classification must have an important—or exceedingly persuasive—governmental
objective, and the means must be substantially related to that objective.108
E. Cases in which Breast Censorship Laws Held to Violate the Equal Protection Clause
The intermediate scrutiny standard has since been applied to both uphold and strike down
female breast censorship laws. The following cases are some of the few in which judges struck
down such laws after analyzing them under some version of the two-pronged intermediate
scrutiny test. These cases illustrate the types of analyses with which courts engage when
resolving breast censorship challenges. Ultimately, Part III builds on and augments the
reasoning in the following cases in establishing that female breast censorship laws violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
1. People v. David
In 1989, Mary Lou Schloss and Romona Santorelli had a topless picnic at a public beach
in Rochester, New York.109 Along with twenty to thirty other women, Schloss and Santorelli
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“removed their shirts and swam, sunbathed, and played volleyball.”110 They were arrested for
violating New York Penal Law section 245.01, 111 which read:
A person is guilty of exposure if he appears in a public place in such a manner
that the private or intimate parts of his body are unclothed or exposed. For
purposes of this section, the private or intimate parts of a female person shall
include that portion of the breast which is below the top of the areola. This section
shall not apply to the breastfeeding of infants or to any person entertaining or
performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.112
The women were first convicted by a judge who upheld the constitutionality of the law, in part
by relying on the biblical book of Genesis.113 The state appellate court, however, found the
“statute's gender classification violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the [United States] and
[New York State] Constitutions.”114
The court based its holding on a straightforward application of a version of the current
intermediate scrutiny test. First, instead of asking whether the classification had an important
governmental objective, the court asked whether “the statute protect[ed] a legitimate government
interest.”115 The court’s entire analysis of this prong consisted of one sentence. Relying on
another New York state case, the court found that “protecting the public's sensibilities is a
legitimate government interest.”116
Next, instead of asking whether the means of sex-based classification were substantially
related to that government objective—the “tailoring” prong of the analysis—the court asked
whether “the gender-based classification [was] a reasonable means of achieving substantial

110

Id.
Id.
112
People v. David, 152 Misc. 2d 66, 67 (Munroe Cnty. Ct. 1991) (quoting Penal Law § 245.01).
113
See Glazer, supra note 50, at 124–25.
114
David, 152 Misc. 2d at 68. The court noted, however, that the statute could be “construed to be gender neutral
and implicitly include in its prohibitions the exposure of a male's breast as violative of the statute where it is
satisfactorily demonstrated that it constitutes ‘private or intimate parts’ of a person. Though an equal protection
violation has been determined, the law does not require reversal of the conviction on that ground.” Id.
115
Id. at 67.
116
Id.
111

20

government ends and not merely the arbitrary classifying of people by sexual sterotypes [sic].”117
This analysis is more deferential to the state than the current constitutional standard. This is
because the New York court required only a reasonable relationship, rather than a substantial
relationship, between the classification and the government purpose. Moreover, the New York
appellate court in this case interpreted reasonableness to mean “not merely. . . arbitrary,”118
which lowers the threshold even further. If, then, a law is still struck down as violating the Equal
Protection Clause under this interpretation of the constitutional standard, it certainly would not
have withstood scrutiny under the standard as it is known and applied today.
In its tailoring analysis, the New York appellate court identified the government purpose
as protecting public sensibilities. It therefore focused on whether there was something particular
about the female breast that threatened public sensibilities. The court’s primary analysis relied
heavily on expert witnesses opining that “[m]ale and female breasts are physiologically similar
except for lactation capability.”119 Given the similarities, the court concluded that the “gender
based classification does not serve the legitimate governmental interest better than would a
gender neutral law.”120
Interestingly, the court went on to note that the experts also concluded that community
standards had evolved to the point where female breasts were no longer considered a private or
intimate body part.121 Although in the context of the remedy, this conclusion could be understood
as another reason for finding that censoring the public female breast was not a reasonable way to
protect public sensibilities. First, public sensibilities do not need protection from a body part
whose only sex-based distinction is lactation abilities. Second, even if community norms are
117
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used, experts testified that the female breast is no longer understood as an intimate body part that
needs to be shielded to protect the public. The court could have also intended these two reasons
as support for the same point: because the only physical difference between a female breast and a
male breast is lactation ability, it is not an intimate body part, and its regulation is not reasonably
related to protecting public sensibilities. In any event, the New York appellate court in People v.
David found that in 1991, public sensibilities did not require the censorship of female breasts.
The gender classification was struck down.122
2. Williams v. City of Fort Worth
In Williams v. City of Fort Worth,123 a nightclub owner alleged that a Fort Worth zoning
ordinance was unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. One of those reasons was that the
ordinance was an equal protection violation as it “only regulates exposure of female breasts but
not male breasts and, therefore, unconstitutionally discriminates against female topless dancers
and proprietors of clubs featuring female topless dancers.”124 The ordinance defined nudity as:
“less than completely and opaquely covered: a) Human genitals, pubic region or pubic hair, b)
Human buttock, c) Female breast or breasts below a point immediately above the top of the
areola.”125
After a lengthy analysis, the court held that the nudity portion of the ordinance violated
the equal protection rights of female topless dancers.126 Importantly, the Texas appeals court in
this case was not analyzing the ordinance under the United States Equal Protection Clause but
122
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the Texas Equal Rights Amendment. If a law is found to discriminate on the basis of sex in
Texas, it “survive[s] strict judicial scrutiny ‘only if the proponent can prove that there is no other
manner to protect the state's compelling interests.’”127 Unlike in People v. Davis, this is a higher
standard of review than the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Clause doctrine demands.
Nevertheless, under the court’s reasoning, the law could not survive the less strict intermediate
scrutiny standard.
In considering whether the law discriminated on the basis of sex, the court rejected two
arguments commonly made by defenders of female breast censorship laws: real physical
difference between male and female breasts and the eroticization of the female breast. The City
argued that the ordinance does not treat women differently because they are women, but only
because their breasts are physically different from men’s breasts.128 The court, however, rejected
the physical difference argument because the City failed to show why physical difference
required different treatment under the statute.129 Next, amici curiae for the City argued that the
ordinance merely regulates erogenous zones, which include the female breast, but not the male
breast.130 The court first called into question the flimsy support the amici had cited, and then
highlighted the inherently discriminatory perspective such justification would require the court to
adopt:
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Our court is not authorized . . . to take judicial notice of the concept that the
breasts of female topless dancers, unlike their male counterparts, are commonly
associated with sexual arousal. Such a viewpoint might be subject to reasonable
dispute, depending on the sex and sexual orientation of the viewer.131
After holding that the ordinance discriminated against women as women, the court found
that the ordinance was not the only way to protect the City’s compelling interest of preventing
secondary neighborhood effects, as the record contained no proof of a connection whatsoever.132
As a result, the court struck down the nudity definition in the ordinance.133
3. People v. Santorelli
People v. Santorelli, a case decided by New York’s highest state court, is a frequently
cited case on the topic of female breast censorship.134 The facts underlying this case are similar
to People v. David because the case involved the same defendants. In June of 1986, Romona
Santorelli and eight other women removed their tops in an expression of public disagreement
with a New York law that criminalized the public exposure of the female, but not male, breast.135
Seven women were arrested.136
Despite the majority holding that the convictions for topless sunbathing were rightly
dismissed in a court below,137 the concurring opinion is more often discussed. This is because
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only the concurrence, not the five-paragraph majority opinion, engaged in Equal Protection
Clause analysis.138
The concurrence analyzed the case under the two-pronged intermediate scrutiny test
associated with sex-based Equal Protection Clause challenges.139 Like in People v. David, the
concurrence first identified the government interest as protection of public sensibilities.140
Unlike in People v. David, however, the concurrence found this interest to be the source of the
constitutional problem.
[T]he concept of “public sensibility” itself, when used in these contexts, may be
nothing more than a reflection of commonly held preconceptions and biases. One
of the most important purposes to be served by the Equal Protection Clause is to
ensure that “public sensibilities” grounded in prejudice and unexamined
stereotypes do not become enshrined as part of the official policy of
government.141
The concurrence then described the danger that “public sensibilities” in this context are
likely just a proxy for stereotypes. First, “the female breast is no more or less a sexual organ
than is the male equivalent.”142 Moreover, even though some may find the female breast arouses
the prurient interests, such a perspective is itself “a suspect cultural artifact rooted in centuries of
prejudice and bias toward women.”143 Without even addressing the tailoring aspect of the
intermediate scrutiny inquiry, the concurrence concluded that the criminal statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause based on the absence of an important governmental interest.144
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II.

THE COSTS OF CENSORSHIP
Female breast censorship is normatively harmful. First, it perpetuates heterosexual male

definitions of eroticism, contributing to the sexual and political subjugation of women. Second,
it enforces dangerous body image issues. Lastly, it deprives women of the choice to be
comfortable. This Part aims to show that there are normative grounds for objecting to female
breast censorship laws.145
A. Eroticism and the Subjugation of Women
The eroticization of the female breast has perpetuated the subjugation of women. Yet,
the eroticism of female breasts is not a universally held belief. In other cultures around the
world, the female breast does not have an erotic meaning.146 This does not mean, however, that
other body parts are not similarly sexualized. Scholar Marilyn Yalom writes:
Non-Western cultures have their own fetishes—small feet in China, the nape of
the neck in Japan, the buttocks in Africa and the Caribbean. In each instance, the
sexually charged body part—what the French poet Mallarme refers to as ‘the
veiled erotic’—owes much of its fascination to full or partial concealment.147
One might thus conclude: the more public the body part, the less sexual the body part.
Female breast censorship ensures concealment, which makes it more difficult for female breasts
to shed their sexual character.
Eroticized body parts are not necessarily harmful. However, when eroticized body parts
develop into the eroticization of a class of people, there is a danger that the class’s sexuality
overshadows other aspects of the class. In the case of female breasts, the eroticization comes
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primarily from the heterosexual male point of view.148 As legal scholar Luke Boso points out,
“[s]ociety . . . has carved out an exception to the general nonacceptance of female breast
exposure: exposure to entertain or sexually arouse males.”149 This is evidenced in that “[w]omen
are often free to expose their breasts at times and in places in which men desire it: at topless bars
and clubs, in pornography, and in the bedroom.”150 Heterosexual male eroticization of the
female breast, sanctioned by government laws that require its censorship when not in certain
circumstances, threatens to—or perhaps continues to—subjugate women as a class, by
objectifying women and dictating how, where, and why they may present their bodies.151
The sexualization of the female breast emanating mainly from the heterosexual male
viewpoint is important because, as Virginia Milstead has remarked, it “overlooks the perspective
of women on the issue, and what women find erotic. It in fact overlooks the perspective of
anyone who is not a heterosexual male.”152 In fact, some research has demonstrated that women
find the male chest the most sexually stimulating body part.153 Moreover, male and female
breasts are both capable of sexual arousal.154
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See Milstead, supra note 8, at 282. (“In any case, the greater difficulty with the courts' conclusion that women's
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The heterosexual male eroticization of the female breast has led to, or at least allowed
for, the continued public censorship of the female breast. Because female breasts are sexual to
heterosexual males, they must be covered to avoid arousing men.155 This is problematic for two
reasons: first, it requires women instead of men to be responsible for heterosexual men’s
urges;156 and second, it restricts women based on other’s perception of them.157 Both of these
problems enforce women’s subjugation, as the law requires women to cover up for men, and
disregards women’s choices free from the male perspective.158
B. Enforcement of Dangerous Body Image Issues
Female breast censorship reinforces female breast eroticization.159 Female breast
eroticization contributes to the general sexual objectification of women in relation to men.160
Such objectification produces dangerous body image issues for women.161
Society plays an important role in how individuals view themselves and their bodies.162
One important societal factor that impacts body image is the way one imagines other people
155
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perceive their body.163 The law helps mold such perceptions.164 For example, if concealment of
a body part contributes to the body part’s sexuality, a law mandating concealment perpetuates
the body part’s sexuality.165 This is the case with female breasts and female breast censorship
laws. As discussed, these laws can lead to eroticization and objectification of women.166
Unsurprisingly, feelings of objectification can lead to body shame and anxiety.167
Women are already more likely than men to have body image issues.168 Body image
issues can lead to a variety of serious physical and mental impairments, like eating disorders,
depression, anxiety, and suicidality, among others.169 Feelings of objectification have been
specifically linked to higher rates of depression and eating disorders.170
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The law should be careful not to perpetuate dangerous body image issues, given the
seriousness of its effects, especially on women. But female breast censorship laws do just that.
They reinforce female breast eroticization, which can lead to objectification, which in turn
produces body image issues.
C. Deprivation of Comfort
Finally, the right for women to bare their breasts publically allows women the choice to
be comfortable. Female breast censorship deprives women of that choice. Naturally, being
topless in public may not be desirable in all places, at all times, for all people. Men tend to enjoy
this option of undress during warm weather, in places like beaches, parks, and festivals. Social
stigma and restrictive laws aside, some women would also likely enjoy being able to go without
tops in such situations.171 Currently, however, for women to do so, they not only face the fear of
law, but also harassment.
That women are harassed when they breast-feed in public is indicative of the problem.172
Even women who are using their breasts to fulfill a biological purpose are subjected to unwanted

dissatisfaction over their appearance.”); See also Body Image and Health - 2002. Revised 2009,
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attention. Indeed, several states have carved out breast-feeding exceptions for laws that
otherwise censor the female breast.173 Ultimately, eliminating female breast censorship laws
altogether would better protect breast-feeding women.174
This understanding depends on a certain logical chain. Breast censorship laws encourage
society’s understanding of the female breast as sexual; because the female breast is sexualized,
the public female breast is seen as inappropriate and can result in harassment. Accordingly,
abolishing breast censorship laws will reduce the sexualization of the female breast, allowing
women to bare their breasts without fear of harassment. Of course, abolition of breast censorship
laws alone is insufficient. Women must also be willing to take advantage of the legal choice to
be topless. Groups like the Outdoor Co-Ed Topless Pulp Fiction Appreciation Society in New
York, where female toplessness is legal, demonstrate that some women are so willing.
Only when women begin to bare their breasts publically in the same manner as men—
which would result more quickly without censorship laws—will public female breasts become a
“non-event.”175 At that point, harassment will no longer be a barrier to a woman’s choice to be
comfortable.
III.

FEMALE BREAST CENSORSHIP VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
The censorship of the public female breast, but not the public male breast, violates the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A law that regulates the female breast
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applies only to members of one sex, patently denying “the equal protection of the laws” between
the two sexes.
This Part responds to commonly-cited reasons that courts use to deny Equal Protection
Clause challenges by analyzing female breast censorship laws under the two-pronged
intermediate scrutiny standard required by the Supreme Court. First, this Part argues that based
on current societal norms, there is no important governmental interest to justify female breast
censorship. Second, even if an important governmental interest exists, the sex-based
classification is not substantially related to that interest. A proper means analysis results in
substantial overinclusivness and underinclusivness. Finally, this Part turns to the recent Supreme
Court cases United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, which contain additional support
for Equal Protection Clause challenges to female breast censorship.
Although a handful of courts have already found Equal Protection Clause violations,
most courts have upheld these facially discriminatory laws by relying on improper Equal
Protection Clause analyses and outdated societal norms. Importantly, if a court faces such a
challenge today, it is insufficient to simply rely on one line of cases or the other. Instead, the
court must properly account for evidence of modern public norms—at least when the
government advances the interest of protecting public sensibilities.
A. No Important Governmental Objective
Analyzing female breast censorship laws under an intermediate scrutiny standard, as
doctrine demands, demonstrates that such laws do not pass constitutional muster. First, the sexbased classification must have an important governmental objective. Indeed, the classification
must have an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”176
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Proponents of female breast censorship laws have offered a variety of supposed important
governmental objectives for upholding such censorship, including preventing riots,177 shielding
children, and protecting women from assault.178 More commonly, courts cite protecting public
sensibilities as the important governmental objective that satisfies this prong of the analysis.179
The changing understanding of the public female breast, however, undermines this justification.
The protection of public sensibilities is far from “exceedingly persuasive.”
“Public sensibilities” is an amorphous and subjective concept. As a result, courts that
invoke it generally attempt to make it more concrete by relying on two lines of support:
community standards and the doctrine of real difference.180 Given shifting societal norms, both
justifications fall short.
1. Modern Community Standards Do Not Require Breast Censorship
In People v. Craft, the court explained that the governmental objective was “to protect the
general public from being accosted by offensive conduct in public places,” which included
women baring their breasts.181 The court attempted to justify this “public sensibilities” argument
by stating that New York’s police power includes the ability to prohibit public nudity.182 But
this statement merely kicked the question down the road—why are only bare female breasts

177

See DeJong & Smith, supra note 10, at 143–45 (discussing convictions invoking this rationale and disputing its
veracity).
178
See Boso, supra note 2, at 148 (arguing such claims are disingenuous); DeJong & Smith, supra note 10, at 145–
46.
179
See, e.g., United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1991) (important government interest is
“protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of society that still does not want to be exposed willynilly to public displays of various portions of their fellow citizens' anatomies that traditionally in this society have
been regarded as erogenous zones.”); State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d 551, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
180
Real difference and community norms are not always mutually exclusive lines of reasoning. See Milstead, supra
note 8, at 277 (“While claiming that the laws are based on physical differences, the courts nevertheless reveal that
their main concern is how the public perceives female breasts.”).
181
People v. Craft, 134 Misc. 2d 121, 124, (NY City Ct. 1986) rev'd, 149 Misc. 2d 223 (NY Co. Ct. 1991) rev'd sub
nom. People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875 (1992). Even though this case was ultimately reversed, the court’s
reasoning provides relevant insight into how courts justify facially discriminatory breast censorship laws in the face
of Equal Protection Clause challenges.
182
Craft, 134 Misc. 2d at 124.

33

subject to nudity regulation, although bare male breasts are not? The court ultimately answered
that, “community standards, as perceived by the Legislature, regard the female breast as an
intimate part of the human body.”183
The court’s justification is exceedingly unpersuasive for two reasons. First, community
standards no longer understand the female breast as an intimate body part that requires
covering.184 But, even if a legislature regarded the female breast as intimate, the legislature’s
finding is not the unreviewable final word on what constitutes an intimate part of the human
body, such that it can freely regulate that body part even if regulations differ between the sexes.
At that point, the Equal Protection Clause comes into play and courts have a role in determining
the law’s constitutionality.
Initially, that female breasts were an intimate body part by societal standards in 1986, the
year People v. Craft was decided, can be disputed.185 But even if they were, the 1986
community standard is not the yardstick by which to measure community standards today.186
Community standards have evolved greatly in the past twenty-nine years.187 The existence of
organizations like the Outdoor Co-Ed Topless Pulp Fiction Appreciation Society, Free the
Nipple, and GoTopless, among others discussed in Part I, demonstrates that the community
183
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standard has begun to embrace the public female breast as being no different than the public
male breast. Despite female breast censorship laws, and despite some members of society still
clinging to the view that the female breast is uniquely erotic, women are demanding to go
topless.188
One could argue that these acts of resistance are coming from a minority of citizens, and
thus do not represent modern norms. But this argument assumes that the majority of citizens
who have not engaged with these issues are actively for female breast censorship. The
assumption is erroneous. At best, the majority of citizens appears neutral on the issue. If not,
one would expect to find incidents of groups protesting to enforce female breast censorship laws,
or counter-protesting female topless demonstrations, for example.189 Even aside from groups
devoted to equal topless rights for women, current fashion trends are evidence of a community
standard that has begun to accept the public female breast.190 Moreover, at least one recent
nudity statute in a large municipality allows the display of male and female breasts alike.191
Female breast censorship only makes sense from a historically-entrenched heterosexual male
point of view, which understands the female breast as primarily erotic.192
Second, if protecting public sensibilities, as defined by community standards, can be
deemed an important governmental interest in the Equal Protection Clause analysis, then those
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standards should not be defined by the legislature alone. If permissible, then laws that classify
on the basis of sex can always overcome the first prong of judicial review as long as the
legislature declares the classification to be based on community standards. Unless courts wish to
relinquish their power of judicial review—at least in regards to the first prong of the intermediate
scrutiny inquiry—they must measure community standards by more than a law’s passage in the
legislature.
Furthermore, recall that a woman who exposes her breasts to communicate political
disagreement with breast censorship laws is probably protected under the First Amendment.193
The likely legality of this conduct illustrates that protecting public sensibilities is actually an
impermissible pretense for perpetuating a stereotype that harms women. In the context of protest,
the public female breast is acceptable; but in the context of sunbathing, the public female breast
is not. Thus, the purpose for which a woman reveals her breasts could be determinative of the
legality of her action. That is, she might be allowed to bare her breasts in protest protected by the
First Amendment, but not allowed to bare her breasts for comfort protected by the Equal
Protection Clause. If this is the case, then either protecting public sensitivities is a sham
governmental interest (as evidenced by it only mattering in certain contexts), or, the individual
right to political expression outweighs the interest in public sensitivities. In both cases, the
inconsistent application of the law reveals the deep flaw in the justification of protecting public
sensibilities.
2. Real Difference Justification as Stereotypes in Disguise
Courts also try to bolster the public sensibilities justification by claiming that female
breasts and male breasts are physically different, and it is the difference of the female breast that
would offend the public, which allows for its censorship. In Craft v. Hodel, plaintiffs challenged
193
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a National Park Service regulation that barred public nudity, defined as: “a person's intentional
failure to cover with a fully opaque covering that person's own genitals, pubic areas, rectal area,
or female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola when in a public
place.”194
The district court upheld the statute in the face of an Equal Protection Clause challenge,
based on the important governmental interest of protecting public sensibilities as they relate to
the real difference between male and female breasts.195 Quoting from People v. Craft, the court
found that the important governmental interest “is to protect the public from invasions of its
sensibilities, and merely reflects current community standards as to what constitutes nudity.”196
But the Hodel court went one step further in trying to reify “community standards.” The nudity
regulation was not about stereotypes, the court insisted, but was based on recognition of “a
physical difference between the sexes which has implications for the moral and aesthetic
sensitivities of a substantial majority of the country.”197 Similarly, a New Jersey appellate court
agreed that, “[p]rotecting the public sensibilities is an important governmental interest based on
an indisputable difference between the sexes.”198
There are two doctrinal difficulties with a court’s injection of “physical difference” into
breast censorship Equal Protection Clause analysis. First, an announcement of “real difference”
is often impermissibly used as an excuse to bypass the first prong of the two-step intermediate
scrutiny inquiry. Second, the existence of real difference adds nothing to the argument that the
protection of public sensibilities is an important government interest.
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Courts sometimes begin their analysis of breast censorship cases by invoking the real
difference between male and female breasts. These courts claim that, “the difference is
biological.”199 Initially, these courts are correct: female breasts are biologically different from
male breasts in their lactation abilities. The problem is that too often courts stop at this point,
and declare the real difference between female and male breasts as justifying the regulation of
the female breast.
J & B Social Club No. 1, Inc. v. City of Mobile is instructive.200 In J & B Social Club, the
Mobile, Alabama City Council enacted an ordinance that banned females, but not males, from
dancing topless in bars.201 Despite the ordinance classifying on the basis of sex, which is a
suspect class that triggers intermediate scrutiny review, the court refused to apply an Equal
Protection Clause analysis. “It is apparent to the naked eye, and this court takes judicial notice,
that female breasts are quite often different from male ones,” the court asserted.202 “In this
regard, men and women are not ‘similarly situated,’ and the ordinance therefore raises no
impermissible gender classification.”203 Such an approach impermissibly bypasses the entire
intermediate scrutiny analysis based on the court’s judicial notice that there is a difference
between male and female breasts. Upon finding this real physical difference, the rest of the
court’s Equal Protection Clause analysis includes the following: “Assuming, however, that such
a distinction is ‘gender-based’ for equal protection purposes, the court finds that the distinction is
substantially related to an important governmental interest.”204
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Like in J & B Social Club, sometimes courts frame the analysis in terms of men and
women being “similarly situated” or not. But, as legal scholar Giovanna Shay argues:
properly understood, ‘similarly situated’ is not a threshold hurdle to equal
protection analysis on the merits in cases involving facial classifications . . . . In
cases regarding express categories, no matter the level of equal protection scrutiny
applied, the focus of the “similarly situated” analysis is substantially the same as
the key inquiry of equal protection review: Does the legislative classification bear
a close enough relationship to the purpose of the statute?205
In City of Albuquerque v. Sachs, a New Mexico appellate court was tasked with
analyzing whether an Albuquerque ordinance barring public nudity violated the New Mexico
Equal Rights Amendment for prohibiting the public display of female breasts “without a fully
opaque covering of [the] entire nipple,” but not male breasts.206 Yet, the court improperly
bypassed a substantive analysis upon finding a physical difference between male and female
breasts.207 As Judge Linda M. Vanzi explained, the court “used a biological difference to justify
a social stereotype. Notwithstanding documentary evidence that there is no inherent, significant
difference between men's and women's breasts, it appears that the court was primarily concerned
not with whether there is a difference but rather with societal norms.”208
In yet another example of improperly bypassing the intermediate scrutiny analysis, the
court in Tagami v. City of Chicago found that the plaintiff, who was challenging a Chicago
indecent exposure ordinance, failed to state an Equal Protection Clause claim.209 The court
found, “while the Ordinance permits men but not women to appear bare-chested in public,
Tagami fails to allege how this distinction places ‘artificial constraints’ on a woman's
opportunity, or how the [Ordinance] is used to ‘create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
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economic inferiority of women.’”210 Not only is such a showing not required,211 but in fact the
sex-discriminatory ordinance does perpetuate the social inferiority of women.212
Courts commonly invoke real difference in an attempt to bolster the public sensitivities
argument, even though the real differences between male and female breasts do not make female
breasts more in need of shielding. The biological difference, after all, is lactation ability, and
most states have exceptions to public nudity and obscenity laws for breast-feeding mothers.213 If
the real difference is the justification for protecting sensibilities, then why is a demonstration of
that real difference—breastfeeding—specifically allowed in full display of the public?214 In
actuality, a court’s determination of real difference between male and female breasts is used to
impermissibly justify discriminatory stereotypes.215
In analyzing a law under the Equal Protection Clause, courts must ensure the important
governmental interest is not actually enforcing a stereotype. The need to root out laws that
classify based on gender stereotypes is one reason women were deemed a suspect class in the
first place.216 In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court instructed:
[T]he test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is
straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. 217
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Courts that invoke real difference as further justification for protecting public sensibilities
defy this command.218 This is because such invocations are revealed to be no more than social
constructions based on stereotypes. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Biocic essentially
admits this to be true. It identified the important governmental interest as “protecting the moral
sensibilities of that substantial segment of society that still does not want to be exposed willynilly to public displays of various portions of their fellow citizens' anatomies that traditionally in
this society have been regarded as erogenous,” which include the female breast.219
Yet, research and physiological realities challenge the veracity of the claim that female
breasts are erogenous, while male breasts are not.220 This real difference, then, is no more than a
stereotype in disguise. As previously explained, the claim that female breasts must be censored
to protect the public is a primarily heterosexual male viewpoint, based on the sexualization of
female breasts. From this understanding, the objective of protecting the public mores reflects an
impermissible “archaic and stereotypic notion[].”221
B. Means Not Substantially Related
Even if the protection of public sensibilities was deemed an important governmental
interest, female breast censorship laws are not substantially related to that objective. Society’s
understanding of the breast has evolved to the point that the public female breast would not lead
to an erosion of public sensibilities. Moreover, female breast censorship laws are both
underinclusive and overinclusive to the governmental goal, which signals that the laws should
fail the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny analysis.
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Almost a quarter of a century has passed since a New York appellate court found that
public sensibilities did not require the censorship of female breasts.222 Given the majority of
cases that hold otherwise, however, one may fairly argue that the court’s conclusion in People v.
David was an anomaly. Even if that is the case, new evidence shows that society’s
understanding of the public female breast has evolved to the point that its public display is closer
to a “non-event”223 than a universally offensive action.
Several organizations have formed within the last twenty years to protest female breast
censorship laws and provide legal aid to women facing issues related to female breast
censorship.224 In New York, where it is legal for women to be topless, women are forming
groups to take advantage of that right.225 Furthermore, the fashion industry has embraced the
female breast, with 2014 designs from multiple designers featuring sheer and see-through tops
for women.226 In 2015, there were 66 planned Go Topless Day actions, with over 30 planned in
the United States, in which women protested female breast censorship by baring their breasts.227
Celebrities are also voicing their support for female breast equality.228 Even though some may
be surprised to see the female breast in public, surprise is not a reaction that requires protecting
public sensibilities. In light of how the modern public understands the female breast, one would
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be hard pressed to argue that female breast censorship is substantially related to protecting the
modern public’s sensibilities.
Furthermore, female breast censorship laws are both over- and underinclusive to the goal
of protecting public sensibilities. They are overinclusive because a growing segment of the
public is simply not offended by the public female breast. They are underinclusive because
public sensibilities might need protection from similarly offensive breasts that are currently
legally allowed to be on display. For example, some may take offense to seeing large male
breasts or male breasts that look like female breasts. Some may need protecting from the erotic
male chest in general.229 More broadly, there are a plethora of human activities that people may
find unwelcome, unattractive, or offensive in public, yet most such activities are not illegal.230
Evidence of society’s understanding of the public female breast, as well as the
overinclusive and underinclusive nature of female breast censorship laws, reveals that such laws
are not substantially related to protecting public sensibilities. They therefore cannot overcome
the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny test.
C. Violation of Equal Protection Clause Principles
Finally, recent Supreme Court precedent contains supplementary support for Equal
Protection Clause challenges to female breast censorship. United States v. Windsor231 and
Obergefell v. Hodges232 suggest that Equal Protection Clause principles are violated by laws that
impose a stigma and disapproval on a class of people, like breast censorship laws do to women.
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In U.S. v. Windsor, the Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a
federal law that defined marriage as between one man and one woman.233 In striking down
DOMA, the Court partially relied on the law’s violation of Equal Protection Clause principles.234
Two years later in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held that same-sex couples have a
fundamental right to marry.235 It anchored its decision in the Due Process Clause,236 but also
analyzed how the Equal Protection Clause informed its holding.237 Female breast censorship
laws do not fit squarely into the framework of these cases.238 Yet, the Supreme Court’s
discussions about Equal Protection Clause principles buttress the argument that female breast
censorship laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.
In Windsor, the Court explained Equal Protection Clause principles by describing laws
that violate these principles. For example, quoting from Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,239
Justice Kennedy in Windsor stated: “The Constitution's guarantee of equality ‘must at the very
least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify
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disparate treatment of that group.”240 More relevant to the female breast censorship context, the
Court went on to suggest that laws motivated by, and having the effect of, disapproving of a
class violate Equal Protection Clause principles.241
The Windsor Court clarified why DOMA had the purpose and effect of disapproving of
gay couples, which sheds some light on what constitutes sufficient disapproval to violate Equal
Protection Clause principles. The Court found, “[t]he avowed purpose and practical effect of
[DOMA is] to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into
same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”242 Thus, whether
a law imposes a disadvantage on a class, a separate status on a class, and a stigma on a class, are
important inquiries.
Female breast censorship laws do all three to women, demonstrating the “purpose and
effect of disapproval of [a] class.”243 First, female breast censorship laws disadvantage women
by making them more vulnerable to body image issues, and by eliminating the choice to be
comfortable without a top in public.244 Women are therefore unable to live as freely and fully as
men. Second, such laws impose a separate status on women’s breasts, as not only different than
men’s breasts, but as body parts that must be hidden away from public sight.245 Finally, the law
brands women’s breasts with a stigma. The inability to reveal one’s breasts in public further
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stigmatizes female breasts as erotic body parts that require covering.246 The stigmatization of
female breasts creates a danger of stigmatizing the women to whom they are attached.
The Obergefell Court recognized that “in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause . . .
new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”247 Modern science,
protest movements, social organizations, and fashion trends provide such insights and societal
understandings, which reveal unjustified inequality in the public display of breasts between the
sexes. Windsor and Obergefell’s discussions of Equal Protection Clause principles strengthen the
conclusion that female breast censorship laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION
Aside from a handful of cases, courts have consistently upheld facially discriminatory
laws that censor the female breast. Initially, then, it might appear difficult for a court faced with
an Equal Protection Clause challenge today to overturn a breast censorship law without flying in
the face of that precedent.248
Yet, a proper intermediate scrutiny analysis requires courts to consider modern
community norms, at least when the government advances a public sensibilities argument.
Modern community norms about the public female breast have changed. As evidenced by social
organizations, fashion trends, and protest movements, modern society is increasingly accepting
of the public female breast. When courts take into account this modern understanding of
society’s perception of the public female breast, it is clear that female breast censorship laws
cannot withstand constitutional muster. Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause principles as
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recently articulated by the Supreme Court further support the finding that female breast
censorship laws are unconstitutional.
Laws prohibiting public displays of the female breast, but not the male breast, are
outdated and harmful. More significantly, they are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
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